Stackelberg-game analysis of correlated attacks in cyber-physical systems

Minghui Zhu, and Sonia Martínez
Proceedings of the 2011 American Control Conference, San Francisco, CA, USA, June 2011

Abstract:

This paper studies a security control problem for discrete-time, linear time-invariant systems subject to state and input constraints. State measurements and control laws are transmitted over a communication network and could be corrupted by adversaries. In particular, we consider a class of adversaries, namely correlated jammers, who are modeled as rational decision makers and whose strategies are highly correlated to the control system operator. The coupled decision-making process is modeled as a two-level Stackelberg game. We propose a receding-horizon Stackelberg control law for the operator, and analyze the resulting performance and closed-loop stability of the system under attacks. Under perfect information assumptions, we observe how regional stability can still be achieved by imposing some system, cost and action restrictions.

File: main.pdf

Bib-tex entry:

@InProceedings{MZ-SM:11-acc,
author = {M. Zhu and S. Mart{\'\i}nez},
booktitle = {2011 American Control Conference},
title = {Stackelberg-game analysis of correlated attacks in cyber-physical systems},
year = {2011},
month = {June},
address = {San Francisco, CA, USA},
pages = {4063-4068}
}